Intuition
https://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/5
Resources about the role of intuition in thinking skills2024-02-19T03:59:55ZIntuitive versus analytical decision making modulates trust in e-commerce
https://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/122
Intuitive versus analytical decision making modulates trust in e-commerce
Ianello, Paola; Balconi, Michela; Antonietti, Alessandro
The hypothesis That intuition and analytical processes affect differently trust in e-commerce was ... tested. Participants were offered a series of products by sellers on the Internet. In the condition intuitive pictures of the sellers were Followed by neutral descriptions and participants had less time to decide Whether to trust the seller. In the analytical condition participants were given an informative description of the seller and had a longer time to decide. Interactions among condition, price and trust Emerged in behavioral and psychophysiological responses. EMG signals during increased At analytical processing, suggesting a cognitive effort, Whereas higher cardiovascular Measures mirrored the emotional involvement When faced to untrustworthy sellers. The study supported the fruitful application of the intuitive vs. analytical approach to e-commerce and of the combination of different sources of information about the buyers while they have to choose to trust the seller in a financial transaction over the Internet.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZThinking, fast and slow
https://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/99
Thinking, fast and slow
Kahneman, Daniel
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman reveals the truth about our intuitions and rationality to teach us how to better our lives. He explores the fascinating flaws and marvels of human behaviour and reveals to us the common errors in people's beliefs.
2012-01-01T00:00:00ZIndividual differences in rational and intuitive thinking styles as predictors of heuristic responses and framing effects
https://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/102
Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking styles as predictors of heuristic responses and framing effects
Shiloh,S,; Salton,E; Sharabi,D
Two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that heuristic responses can be predicted from variance in two ‘thinking styles', rational-analytic and experiential-intuitive, as defined by the cognitive-experiential self-theory [CEST; Epstein, S. (1983), The unconscious, the preconscious and the self-concept. In J. Suls, & A. Greenwald, Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 2, pp. 219–247). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Epstein, S. (1990). Cognitive-experiential self-theory. In: L. Pervin, Handbook of personality theory and research. (pp. 165–192), New York: Guilford. Epstein, S. (1994). An integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709–724. Epstein, S. (1998a). Cognitive-experiential self theory: A dual-process personality theory with implications for diagnosis and psychotherapy. In: R.F. Bornstein & J.M. Masling, Empirical perspectives on the psychoanalytic unconscious. (pp. 99–140), Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association]. Study 1 demonstrated systematic individual differences in participants' normative-statistical versus heuristic responses to judgmental tasks requiring the assessment of chances for the next event in a sequence. Normative-statistical responses were found to be correlated positively with rational thinking style, and negatively with experiential-intuitive thinking style. In study 2, these thinking styles were tested in relation to framing effects [ Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458.]. A 2×2×2 between-subjects experiment was designed with 2 (high/low rational) × 2 (high/low intuitive) × 2 (positive/negative frame) as independent variables, and the tendency to choose non-risky options as the dependent variable. The results showed that specific combinations of thinking styles, high rational/high intuitive and low rational/low intuitive, were the ones most prone to framing effects. The findings were interpreted as supporting the individual-differences perspective on heuristic processing, and as a validation of main assumptions of CEST. Implications regarding individual differences in thinking styles and the interactions between them were discussed.
2002-01-01T00:00:00ZConditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree
https://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/103
Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree
Kahneman, Daniel; Klein, Gary
This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.
2009-01-01T00:00:00Z