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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

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dc.contributor.author Tversky, Amos
dc.contributor.author Kahneman, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned 2015-03-11T13:32:44Z
dc.date.available 2015-03-11T13:32:44Z
dc.date.issued 1974
dc.identifier.citation Science
dc.identifier.issn 0036-8075, 1095-9203
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
dc.identifier.uri http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/32
dc.description.abstract This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
dc.subject Heuristics and biases
dc.title Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
dc.type Article


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