Counter-Insurgency in the Cape Colony, 1872 - 1882

dc.creator	J.S. Kotze
dc.date	2012-02-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-20T20:08:02Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-20T20:08:02Z
dc.identifier	10.5787/31-2-152
dc.identifier	2224-0020
dc.identifier	https://doaj.org/article/e77d5210bacb42c5a12d6a0f603cc35b
dc.identifier.uri	http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/7947
dc.identifier.uri	https://doaj.org/article/e77d5210bacb42c5a12d6a0f603cc35b
dc.description	<p>The acceptance of responsible government in 1872 entailed that the Cape Colony had to provide its own security arrangements. The two British regiments that were still deployed at the Cape were reserved solely for imperial purposes. Moreover, the Cape Government now had to assist the High Commissioner with the maintenance of law and order in the adjacent tribal territories of the Transkei and Basotholand.</p> <p>Unrest and internal conflict were almost endemic in the Cape Colony's area of interest during the period 1872 to 1882. Besides a number of conflict situations of a smaller nature, the colonial forces were involved in five major insurgencies, namely the Cape-Xhosa or Ninth Eastern Frontier War (1877-1878), The Northern Frontier War (1878-1879), the Baphuhti Rebellion (1879), the Transkeian Rebellion (1880-1881) and the Rebellion in Basotholand (1880-1882).</p> <p>This paper traces the development of policy and doctrine, administrative and military, by the Cape Government to pacify the Eastern Cape frontier region. Special attention is given to security and defence policy, the policy of direct control of the adjacent tribal territories as well as the disarmament policy. Furthermore the reactions of the indigenous communities to these policies as well as the demands placed on the colonial military system are investigated.</p> <p>It is concluded that the policies of the successive Cape governments were either impracticable or resulted in the erosion of the traditional power structures among the black communities to the extent that from 1877 onwards, internal conflict became the order of the day. Perceived to be "mere instruments of political will", the colonial forces were synonymous with the reprehensible colonial control and found it impossible to deter public violence or prevent the escalation of the conflicts. The colonial government expected unrealistic strategic results from the colonial armed forces. Military reforms were mostly reactive and too little was done too late. The Molteno as well as the Sprigg ministry eventually paid the highest political price for the failure of their respective defence schemes not least of which was the failure of their counter-insurgency strategies.</p>
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy)
dc.relation	http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/152
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2224-0020
dc.source	Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 31, Iss 2 (2012)
dc.subject	Cape Colony
dc.subject	Rebellion in Basotholand (1880-1882)
dc.subject	the Cape-Xhosa or Ninth Eastern Frontier War (1877-1878)
dc.subject	The Northern Frontier War (1878-1879)
dc.subject	the Baphuhti Rebellion (1879)
dc.subject	the Transkeian Rebellion (1880-1881)
dc.subject	the Rebellion in Basotholand
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.title	Counter-Insurgency in the Cape Colony, 1872 - 1882
dc.type	Article