VICTORY IN HADES: THE FORGOTTEN WARS OF THE OMAN, 1957-1959 AND 1970-1976

dc.creator	S. Monick
dc.date	2012-02-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-20T20:08:30Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-20T20:08:30Z
dc.identifier	10.5787/13-1-591
dc.identifier	2224-0020
dc.identifier	https://doaj.org/article/b8532ad6cecf44dfbbc10c93ae3691e3
dc.identifier.uri	http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8263
dc.identifier.uri	https://doaj.org/article/b8532ad6cecf44dfbbc10c93ae3691e3
dc.description	<p><strong>Part II: The Dhofar Campaign 1970-1976</strong></p><p><strong> Section B</strong></p><p><strong> Introduction:<br /></strong>In section A of this paper, published in a preceding issue of Militaria , it was stated that a detailed analysis of the second Omani war required seperate treatment from a discussion of the Campaign itself, in view of the complex and multifaceted issues generated by the Dhofar Campaign. The Dhofar Campaign embodied both COIN (counter-insurgency) and conventional aspects of modern warfare, and there are important lessons for military theorists attached to both dimensions. With regard to the COIN dimensions, the Dhofar war has received comparatively little detailed study in relation to other COIN wars; the French Indo-China War of 1946-1954 and the Malroyan emergency of 1948-1960, for example, have been the subjects of extensive study, as has the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya in the early 1950s. However, although the wars in the Oman have suffered from comparative neglect, these conflicts in the Persian Gulf are worthy of detailed study, in terms of their relevance to contemporary situations in certain parts of the world (and especially in Southern Africa), to a greater extent than the other fore-mentioned conflicts. Although the wars in Malaya and Kenya are frequently cited as classic models of successful counter-insurgency campaigns, their degree of relevance to the contemporary situation in Southern Africa is extremely limited at best. The victory in Malaya was only secured by heavy expenditure in terms of personnel and finance extending over a period of 12 years. The maximum strength of the Security Forces in Malaya (in 1952) consisted of approximately 40 000 troops (comprising some 25 000 British, 10000 Gurkhas and 5 000 from other Commonwealth countries; in addition to a police force numbering some 40 000. Similarly, the Mau Mau emergency required, at the end of 1953, the expenditure of some 10 000 personnel (the maximum strength reached by the Security Forces), supported by 21 000 police.</p>
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy)
dc.relation	http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/591
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2224-0020
dc.source	Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 13, Iss 1 (2012)
dc.subject	Dhofar Campaign
dc.subject	aspects of modern warfare
dc.subject	Persian Gulf
dc.subject	COIN wars
dc.subject	The French Indo-China War of 1946-1954
dc.subject	The Malroyan emergency of 1948-1960
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.title	VICTORY IN HADES: THE FORGOTTEN WARS OF THE OMAN, 1957-1959 AND 1970-1976
dc.type	Article