Cuito Cuanavale - Wie het werklik Gewen? 'n Strategiese en Operasionele Ontleding

dc.creator	Leopold Scholtz
dc.date	2012-02-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-20T20:08:32Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-20T20:08:32Z
dc.identifier	10.5787/28-1-199
dc.identifier	2224-0020
dc.identifier	https://doaj.org/article/b427a853ab0941fa969c690e907deaa9
dc.identifier.uri	http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8291
dc.identifier.uri	https://doaj.org/article/b427a853ab0941fa969c690e907deaa9
dc.description	<p><em>The Angolan campaign of </em>1987- '88 <em>came as the culmination of a long and bitter war between South Africa and Swapo. Although South Africa's underlying intention was to limit Swapo's guerilla war to the territory of Ovambo, this could only succeed if the Angolan rebel movement Unita could continue covering the southeastern part of Angola. It was, therefore, in South Africa's interest to prevent Unita from being removed from the equation by the massive MPLA offensive of late winter and spring 1987. This was the basic reason for the county’s intervention with Operation Modulêr. The operation was, however, run with excessive operational control from Pretoria. Instead of allowing the officers on the ground a classic Liddell Hartian indirect approach by marching northwards west of the Cuito river to cut the advancing MPLA forces from their logistical hinterland and dislocating their offensive by attacking them from behind, Pretoria forced them into a direct head-on approach east of the river. The reason was to keep the South African involvement secret or, at the very least 'plausibly deniable' - a naïve expectation. This did indeed result in a spectacular South African tactical victory at the Lomba River, where the MPLA offensive was decisively beaten back. But thereafter the South African forces were forced into a series of frontal attacks on increasingly well prepared MPLA defensive positions, including three final attacks on well fortified positions at Tumpo, which were beaten back, resulting in a subsequent stalemate. The stalemate was then brilliantly broken by Cuban forces, who marched to the southwestern </em><em>Namibian border, threatening to cut the South Africans off at Tumpo, or</em><em> </em><em>alternatively to invade Namibia. The campaign is analysed in the light of</em><em> </em><em>military theory, especially the ideas of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart. The</em><em> </em><em>conclusion is that the MPLA lost badly, that South Africa reached its</em><em> </em><em>strategic objectives but did badly operationally, and that Cuba came out</em><em> </em><em>of the affair with flying colours.</em></p>
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy)
dc.relation	http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/199
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2224-0020
dc.source	Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Iss 1 (2012)
dc.subject	Angolan campaign
dc.subject	Swapo's guerilla war
dc.subject	MPLA offensive
dc.subject	Angolan rebel movement Unita
dc.subject	territory of Ovambo
dc.subject	Liddell Hartian
dc.subject	MPLA forces
dc.subject	southwestern Namibian border
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.title	Cuito Cuanavale - Wie het werklik Gewen? 'n Strategiese en Operasionele Ontleding
dc.type	Article