| dc.creator |
Gideon Raz |
|
| dc.date |
2011-05-01T00:00:00Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-20T20:08:37Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2015-07-20T20:08:37Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
2307-793X |
|
| dc.identifier |
2307-8634 |
|
| dc.identifier |
https://doaj.org/article/aa54ef99f4b64d319a771d841757a40d |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8354 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://doaj.org/article/aa54ef99f4b64d319a771d841757a40d |
|
| dc.description |
The Mediterranean Sea, Israel’s only open border, also borders Israel’s enemies to the north and the Gaza Strip to the south, thereby linking it to enemy states. Thus, Israel’s control of this naval arena would enable it to project military strength from the sea, and afford it the capability to embark on landing operations of various types. “The shores of the State of Israel, the naval interface with each of our enemies, require us to expand our naval strength to the point of being able to land forces from the sea. David Ben-Gurion even said that we are bound to view the sea as Israel’s extended western territory.” The naval arena is the Achilles’ heel of Israel’s enemies and therefore also an opportunity for the IDF.However, even if Israel enjoys superiority in the naval arena, it is clear that the battle cannot be decided at sea. In fact, the IDF has aerial and naval superiority, two essential components for the existence of a naval flanking option. In constructing a larger amphibious force, the IDF would be able to translate its naval superiority into a significant contribution for attaining decisions in ground battles. The essay below examines the components of the landing process and offers some recommendations on construction of this type of force. |
|
| dc.language |
English |
|
| dc.publisher |
Institute for National Security Studies |
|
| dc.relation |
http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/import/(file)1308129532.pdf |
|
| dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X |
|
| dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634 |
|
| dc.rights |
CC BY |
|
| dc.source |
Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 3, Iss 1, Pp 45-60 (2011) |
|
| dc.subject |
IDF |
|
| dc.subject |
Israel |
|
| dc.subject |
Israeli navy |
|
| dc.subject |
navy |
|
| dc.subject |
naval forces |
|
| dc.subject |
landing operations |
|
| dc.subject |
naval landings |
|
| dc.subject |
naval strategy |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.title |
Naval Flanking in Ground Warfare |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|