The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity in Cyberspace

dc.creator	Martin C. Libicki
dc.date	2011-12-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-20T20:09:00Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-20T20:09:00Z
dc.identifier	2307-793X
dc.identifier	2307-8634
dc.identifier	https://doaj.org/article/7cfe54c97b8342019e88fdbbfd73aed5
dc.identifier.uri	http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8635
dc.identifier.uri	https://doaj.org/article/7cfe54c97b8342019e88fdbbfd73aed5
dc.description	Strategic ambiguity has an honored place in the mores of statecraft. The studied unwillingness of states to say what they have done (or would do) coupled with the lack of proof that they have done it (or would do it) liberates other states. They can argue that something was done, but if their purposes so dictate, they can pretend that it was not done. The degree of doubt can vary: from thorough (no one is sure what has happened or would happen) to nominal (no one is fooled). In either case, however, those who did it have provided a ﬁg leaf, however translucent, that other states can adopt.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Institute for National Security Studies
dc.relation	http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/import/(file)1333532281.pdf
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634
dc.rights	CC BY
dc.source	Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 3, Iss 3, Pp 3-10 (2011)
dc.subject	cyberspace
dc.subject	cyber attack
dc.subject	cyber warfare
dc.subject	cyberwar
dc.subject	Iran
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.title	The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity in Cyberspace
dc.type	Article