| dc.creator |
Gabi Siboni |
|
| dc.date |
2009-12-01T00:00:00Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-20T20:09:08Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2015-07-20T20:09:08Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
2307-793X |
|
| dc.identifier |
2307-8634 |
|
| dc.identifier |
https://doaj.org/article/6a4b4359d37f40d69c213cb535fdfab8 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8746 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://doaj.org/article/6a4b4359d37f40d69c213cb535fdfab8 |
|
| dc.description |
Before embarking on Operation Cast Lead, the IDF and the defense establishment held many discussions about the need for military action in the Gaza Strip and the strategic objective of such an action in the event it would in fact occur. These discussions were held in light of the sharply worded recommendations of the Winograd Commission. The desire to implement the Winograd Commission's recommendations – even if this was not explicitly stated by the decision makers – dragged out the discussions and the strategic situation assessments, even though at the end of 2008 it was already clear to everyone that in light of the scope of rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip a military operation was inevitable. However, notwithstanding the extent and intensity of the strategic thinking processes and situation assessments by the IDF and the political echelon before the operation, Operation Cast Lead was launched without a clear strategic framework or without an exit strategy formula. This essay contends that against the threat that has developed in recent years, Israel’s war objectives are fixed goals attainable by means of fixed principles of action. The essay thus argues the irrelevance of the terms “victory” or “decision” in the State of Israel's strategic discourse, and then shows why the Winograd Commission recommendation is not only unclear and impossible to implement but is also a recommendation whose potential for damage far exceeds any possible benefit. |
|
| dc.language |
English |
|
| dc.publisher |
Institute for National Security Studies |
|
| dc.relation |
http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/import/(file)1269344811.pdf |
|
| dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X |
|
| dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634 |
|
| dc.rights |
CC BY |
|
| dc.source |
Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 1, Iss 3, Pp 39-49 (2009) |
|
| dc.subject |
Operation Cast Lead |
|
| dc.subject |
IDF |
|
| dc.subject |
Winograd Commission |
|
| dc.subject |
Israel |
|
| dc.subject |
victory |
|
| dc.subject |
strategic discourse |
|
| dc.subject |
political echelon |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.title |
War and Victory |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|