dc.creator |
Giora Segal |
|
dc.date |
2009-04-01T00:00:00Z |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-20T20:09:09Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2015-07-20T20:09:09Z |
|
dc.identifier |
2307-793X |
|
dc.identifier |
2307-8634 |
|
dc.identifier |
https://doaj.org/article/65f419132b164ebbbdfac8efb4362046 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8772 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://doaj.org/article/65f419132b164ebbbdfac8efb4362046 |
|
dc.description |
Hizbollah and Hamas are guerilla and terrorist organizations that in less than 20 years have developed into quasi-governmental entities. They have done so in a relatively smaller area than is usually the case in guerilla warfare, and in the case of the Gaza Strip, primarily in urban areas suited to this type of fighting. The primary military threat that Hamas and Hizbollah pose for Israel is the ongoing launching of rockets and heavy mortar bombs, with varying ranges and impact, directly at the nation’s citizens. The military forces of Hamas and Hizbollah add a secondary, parallel threat to the classical arsenal of guerilla and terrorist activities along Israel’s borders and within its territory: explosives of various kinds, sniper fire, ambush shootings, car bombs, attempts to kidnap soldiers and civilians, and use of suicide bombers wearing explosive belts. Israel’s use of military force in the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead set many political processes in motion, which would largely have not occurred had it not been for the use of the ground forces. This essay examines why the ground maneuver, in conjunction with a disproportionate degree of firepower, was the primary factor in creating a real threat to Hizbollah and Hamas. In addition, the essay explains the logic of the ground maneuver and the basic conditions demanded for its effective use. |
|
dc.language |
English |
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dc.publisher |
Institute for National Security Studies |
|
dc.relation |
http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/import/(file)1272780093.pdf |
|
dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X |
|
dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY |
|
dc.source |
Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 77-88 (2009) |
|
dc.subject |
Hamas |
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dc.subject |
Hizbollah |
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dc.subject |
Israel |
|
dc.subject |
Operation Cast Lead |
|
dc.subject |
ground maneuver |
|
dc.subject |
Gaza |
|
dc.subject |
defense doctrine |
|
dc.subject |
IDF |
|
dc.subject |
Second Lebanon War |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.title |
Trapped Between Maneuver and Firepower: Hamas and Hizbollah |
|
dc.type |
Article |
|