| dc.creator |
Gideon Raz |
|
| dc.date |
2010-10-01T00:00:00Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-20T20:09:28Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2015-07-20T20:09:28Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
2307-793X |
|
| dc.identifier |
2307-8634 |
|
| dc.identifier |
https://doaj.org/article/4115601cd4324abb8507a6ff14464e7c |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/9010 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://doaj.org/article/4115601cd4324abb8507a6ff14464e7c |
|
| dc.description |
Inside the crowded geo-strategic box that is Israel’s domain, the western sector is the only open border and is thus both the Achilles’ heel of Israel enemies and a great opportunity for the IDF. At the same time, technological improvements on the enemy’s side and its growing arsenal of a wide range of rockets and missiles are a severe threat to Israel in every land battle. In the sea domain the navy enjoys many advantages: it is a constant presence in the arena, it is difficult to track, its activity is possible in almost every weather condition, the sea medium affords ways to avoid detection, it operates beyond range of enemy’s weapons (which is not the case for most air force and ground troops bases), and it allows a large scope of armaments on a single naval platform. The IDF must build its naval force to take advantage of this situation. The IDF has yet to realize the full potential of incorporating naval force as an integral part of land battles using accurate long range missiles fired in salvoes from the sea.Over the last decade, several dramatic changes in the nature of war have taken place in the Middle East, requiring thought, analysis, and lesson-learning – i.e., a different implementation of operational action. |
|
| dc.language |
English |
|
| dc.publisher |
Institute for National Security Studies |
|
| dc.relation |
http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/import/(file)1298302355.pdf |
|
| dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X |
|
| dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634 |
|
| dc.rights |
CC BY |
|
| dc.source |
Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 2, Iss 2, Pp 21-37 (2010) |
|
| dc.subject |
IDF |
|
| dc.subject |
Israel |
|
| dc.subject |
naval battlefield |
|
| dc.subject |
navy |
|
| dc.subject |
technology |
|
| dc.subject |
naval force |
|
| dc.subject |
weapons |
|
| dc.subject |
missiles |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
| dc.subject |
U |
|
| dc.title |
Naval Firepower and its Role in Land Battles |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|