dc.creator |
Tal Tovy |
|
dc.date |
2011-11-01T00:00:00Z |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-20T20:09:44Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2015-07-20T20:09:44Z |
|
dc.identifier |
2307-793X |
|
dc.identifier |
2307-8634 |
|
dc.identifier |
https://doaj.org/article/1d5ee9c6413743c7974c45185058ef19 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/9245 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://doaj.org/article/1d5ee9c6413743c7974c45185058ef19 |
|
dc.description |
America’s involvement in Afghanistan since late 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom) is an excellent example of the highly problematic nature of fighting against irregular forces in a state with a long history of instability.This essay analyzes the factors behind Afghanistan’s instability and argues that understanding them can explain the political and military difficulty in destroying irregular forces that share a strong ideology and operate in a given geographical arena. This essay does not purport to offer solutions or recommendations for action; rather, it claims that the primary and most basic action a state must undertake when embarking on a confrontation with irregular forces in a given geographical setting is to understand the history of the region. Such an understanding will allow it to assess how local history has created a political, social, and economic system that is a convenient base for a guerrilla activity grounded in a firm ideological base. The essay claims that understanding the area politically, socially, and demographically allows for the formulation of a strategy and varied modi operandi for defeating the guerrilla forces. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.publisher |
Institute for National Security Studies |
|
dc.relation |
http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/import/(file)1326273560.pdf |
|
dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X |
|
dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY |
|
dc.source |
Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 3, Iss 2, Pp 49-60 (2011) |
|
dc.subject |
guerilla forces |
|
dc.subject |
Afghanistan |
|
dc.subject |
United States |
|
dc.subject |
Taliban |
|
dc.subject |
Pakistan |
|
dc.subject |
Vietnam War |
|
dc.subject |
Soviet Union |
|
dc.subject |
counterinsurgency |
|
dc.subject |
COIN |
|
dc.subject |
Mao Zadong |
|
dc.subject |
ideology |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.title |
Fighting against Irregular Forces: Afghanistan as Test Case |
|
dc.type |
Article |
|