dc.creator |
Leopold Scholtz |
|
dc.date |
2011-08-01T00:00:00Z |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-20T20:10:00Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2015-07-20T20:10:00Z |
|
dc.identifier |
10.5787/38-1-80 |
|
dc.identifier |
2224-0020 |
|
dc.identifier |
https://doaj.org/article/02a8972f21024980901582bcd948877a |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/9449 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://doaj.org/article/02a8972f21024980901582bcd948877a |
|
dc.description |
Ever since 1988, a war of words has been waged about the question who<br />won the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale – the SADF, or the Cuban and Angola<br />forces. A lot depends, of course, on what the South Africans’ strategic and<br />operational objectives were, and whether they reached these or not. On a somewhat<br />lower level, the debate has centred on the question whether the SADF wanted to<br />occupy Cuito Cuanavale. If they did, it becomes easier to argue that South Africa<br />was dealt a heavy reverse there; if not, such an argument becomes more difficult to<br />sustain. In this article, South Africa’s strategic and operational objectives are<br />analysed, based on archival sources. The basic conclusions are that the South<br />African government was realistic enough to see that it could not replace the MPLA<br />with UNITA by force, although it was hoped this might happen through elections.<br />As far as Cuito Cuanavale is concerned, the sources are unequivocal: Although the<br />occupation of the town was indeed discussed, it was never seriously considered. The<br />objective was simply to drive FAPLA over the Cuito River, to prepare the riverbank<br />as a defensive line, to turn it over to UNITA and then to pull back. By far most of<br />the South Africans’ objectives were reached. |
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dc.language |
English |
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dc.publisher |
University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy) |
|
dc.relation |
http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/80 |
|
dc.relation |
https://doaj.org/toc/2224-0020 |
|
dc.source |
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 38, Iss 1 (2011) |
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dc.subject |
Military Science |
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dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
DOAJ:Technology and Engineering |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.subject |
Military Science |
|
dc.subject |
U |
|
dc.title |
THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN ANGOLA, 1987–88 |
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dc.type |
Article |
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