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THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN ANGOLA, 1987–88

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dc.creator Leopold Scholtz
dc.date 2011-08-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned 2015-07-20T20:10:00Z
dc.date.available 2015-07-20T20:10:00Z
dc.identifier 10.5787/38-1-80
dc.identifier 2224-0020
dc.identifier https://doaj.org/article/02a8972f21024980901582bcd948877a
dc.identifier.uri http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/9449
dc.identifier.uri https://doaj.org/article/02a8972f21024980901582bcd948877a
dc.description Ever since 1988, a war of words has been waged about the question who<br />won the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale – the SADF, or the Cuban and Angola<br />forces. A lot depends, of course, on what the South Africans’ strategic and<br />operational objectives were, and whether they reached these or not. On a somewhat<br />lower level, the debate has centred on the question whether the SADF wanted to<br />occupy Cuito Cuanavale. If they did, it becomes easier to argue that South Africa<br />was dealt a heavy reverse there; if not, such an argument becomes more difficult to<br />sustain. In this article, South Africa’s strategic and operational objectives are<br />analysed, based on archival sources. The basic conclusions are that the South<br />African government was realistic enough to see that it could not replace the MPLA<br />with UNITA by force, although it was hoped this might happen through elections.<br />As far as Cuito Cuanavale is concerned, the sources are unequivocal: Although the<br />occupation of the town was indeed discussed, it was never seriously considered. The<br />objective was simply to drive FAPLA over the Cuito River, to prepare the riverbank<br />as a defensive line, to turn it over to UNITA and then to pull back. By far most of<br />the South Africans’ objectives were reached.
dc.language English
dc.publisher University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy)
dc.relation http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/80
dc.relation https://doaj.org/toc/2224-0020
dc.source Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 38, Iss 1 (2011)
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.subject DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.subject DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.subject DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.subject DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.subject Military Science
dc.subject U
dc.title THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN ANGOLA, 1987–88
dc.type Article


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