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Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree

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dc.contributor.author Kahneman, Daniel
dc.contributor.author Klein, Gary
dc.date.accessioned 2015-03-14T08:39:54Z
dc.date.available 2015-03-14T08:39:54Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.citation American Psychologist
dc.identifier.issn 1935-990X
dc.identifier.issn 0003-066X
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016755
dc.identifier.uri http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/103
dc.description.abstract This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.
dc.subject Heuristics and biases
dc.subject Intuition
dc.title Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree
dc.type Article
dc.rights.holder (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved


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  • Intuition [30]
    Resources about the role of intuition in thinking skills
  • Heuristics and Biases [15]
    Papers and resources related to heuristics and biases in cognition
  • Recommended Resources [31]
    A selection of resources that have been recommended by the Thinking Skills Community

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