A Changed Threat?: The Response on the Northern Arena

dc.creator	Gadi Eisenkot
dc.date	2010-06-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-20T20:08:08Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-20T20:08:08Z
dc.identifier	2307-793X
dc.identifier	2307-8634
dc.identifier	https://doaj.org/article/dfbf36882b4d42579781f3acbab69f7e
dc.identifier.uri	http://evidence.thinkportal.org/handle/123456789/8001
dc.identifier.uri	https://doaj.org/article/dfbf36882b4d42579781f3acbab69f7e
dc.description	In light of talk about the northern sector heating up and the possibility of a deterioration into war, the question of the change in the threat facing Israel – from the longstanding situation in which the state’s reference scenario was a surprise attack for the purpose of conquering either limited or more extended territory to the new reality that includes extensive rocket and missile ﬁre at Israeli population centers together with the use of terrorism and guerilla tactics – again rises to the surface. What has changed? What is meant by “a changed threat”? Rocket ﬁre is nothing new; such ﬁre was directed at Israel from Lebanon more than forty years ago. Terrorist attacks also occurred over the years, even before the establishment of the state. To my mind, the change lies in the formulation of a strategic concept whereby the military and civilian rear is the weak point that offsets Israel’s military superiority. The enemy channels its efforts according to a comprehensive, systemic approach of high trajectory ﬁre at civilian areas, and in the Palestinian context, by the widespread use of terrorism inside the State of Israel; the enemy’s assessment is that instilling fear and causing widespread damage will achieve political success. The change in the pattern of action is meant to damage Israel while minimizing the qualitative advantage of Israel’s military. Therefore it is necessary to ﬁnd the appropriate response to this change. Military commanders are supposed to be able to provide a response to a changing threat while at the same time continue to be prepared for the classical threat of enemy armies as well as for the nonconventional threats of chemical and biological warfare.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Institute for National Security Studies
dc.relation	http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/systemfiles/masa%202-1eng%20(5)_eisenkot.pdf
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2307-793X
dc.relation	https://doaj.org/toc/2307-8634
dc.rights	CC BY
dc.source	Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 29-40 (2010)
dc.subject	northern arena
dc.subject	Syria
dc.subject	Second Lebanon War
dc.subject	Hizbollah
dc.subject	Iran
dc.subject	Israel
dc.subject	terrorism
dc.subject	changing threat
dc.subject	war
dc.subject	threat
dc.subject	deterrence
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	DOAJ:Military Science
dc.subject	DOAJ:Technology and Engineering
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.subject	Military Science
dc.subject	U
dc.title	A Changed Threat?: The Response on the Northern Arena
dc.type	Article