Description:
In light of talk about the northern sector heating up and the possibility of a deterioration into war, the question of the change in the threat facing Israel – from the longstanding situation in which the state’s reference scenario was a surprise attack for the purpose of conquering either limited or more extended territory to the new reality that includes extensive rocket and missile fire at Israeli population centers together with the use of terrorism and guerilla tactics – again rises to the surface. What has changed? What is meant by “a changed threat”? Rocket fire is nothing new; such fire was directed at Israel from Lebanon more than forty years ago. Terrorist attacks also occurred over the years, even before the establishment of the state. To my mind, the change lies in the formulation of a strategic concept whereby the military and civilian rear is the weak point that offsets Israel’s military superiority. The enemy channels its efforts according to a comprehensive, systemic approach of high trajectory fire at civilian areas, and in the Palestinian context, by the widespread use of terrorism inside the State of Israel; the enemy’s assessment is that instilling fear and causing widespread damage will achieve political success. The change in the pattern of action is meant to damage Israel while minimizing the qualitative advantage of Israel’s military. Therefore it is necessary to find the appropriate response to this change. Military commanders are supposed to be able to provide a response to a changing threat while at the same time continue to be prepared for the classical threat of enemy armies as well as for the nonconventional threats of chemical and biological warfare.