Description:
On August 12, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, paving the way for the end of 34 days of warfare between Israel and Hizbollah, a campaign later named the Second Lebanon War. Apart from the immediate need to establish a ceasefire, the Security Council hoped to change the security reality in southern Lebanon while neutralizing the elements that were responsible for the escalation, and prevent the repetition of another round of fighting between the sides. Resolution 1701 ostensibly gave an adequate response to Israel’s security needs on the Lebanese front and significantly limited Hizbollah’s ability to rearm in southern Lebanon. The purpose of this essay is to examine Hizbollah’s renewed force buildup since the end of the war in August 2006 despite the constraints of Resolution 1701, to understand the foundations underlying the rearmament of the last three years, and on the basis of this analysis to infer future trends in the organization’s operational doctrine and the operative logic behind the trends. The essay analyzes a number of aspects of Hizbollah’s force buildup, such as manpower, armaments, training, and deployment in the arena, in context of the lessons the organization learned from its various successes and failures in the war. The essay also examines the extent to which these conclusions match the organization’s plan for confrontation against the IDF in the next round.