Suicide attacks are a subject that has been studied and researched extensively, with the primary emphasis on the phenomenon of suicide as a terrorist weapon. Yet although it has been nearly a decade since the outbreak of the violent Palestinian uprising, the combat features used by the IDF and the security services against terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular, the most lethal form of terrorism, have not been studied in depth. The purpose of this essay is to attempt to understand the major components of activity that resulted in the near eradication of the phenomenon. The focus of this paper is the war on terrorism in Judea and Samaria without dealing with terrorism from the Gaza Strip, which has developed and assumed different forms over the years and is beyond the scope of this essay. This paper seeks to provide an historical picture of the processes employed by Israel in an attempt to foil suicide terrorism. The first part of the essay examines the political directives issued by the Israeli government to the IDF from 2000, when the fighting erupted, until the government decision that led to Operation Defensive Shield. The second part examines the implementation of the directives and the development of the military and security response to suicide terrorism. This part of the essay also analyzes the process of formulating the military strategy for fighting terrorism in Judea and Samaria. The last part of the essay analyzes the ethical components of fighting a war on suicide terrorism that had the potential of being highly detrimental to the values of the IDF.