Description:
From the sixties to the late eighties, the border war became a household term<br />in South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of young white men were called up for<br />military service, and many served in some or other capacity in Namibia – then South<br />West Africa – often in the so-called operational area, often as combat troops. These<br />young men were told that they were there to fight communism and that Swapo (the<br />South West African People’s Organisation), the enemy, had to be bested for peace<br />and freedom to come to the southern African subcontinent.<br />Nevertheless, when the UN-supervised elections came after years of<br />international wrangling, Swapo won handsomely, obtaining 57 per cent of the votes.<br />The South African Government and South African Defence Force (SADF) was<br />taken aback, because they really had believed that the anti-Swapo coalition would<br />get a majority.2 The question therefore is: How was this possible? Did the South<br />Africans, who developed a sophisticated strategy to counter-revolutionary guerrilla<br />warfare and really were convinced that they had Swapo on the run, make mistakes<br />they were not aware of? Did they disobey in practice the rules they supported in<br />theory? It will be the purpose of this analysis to answer this question.